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A phylogenetic approach to anxiety is proposed. The diﬀerent facets of human anxiety and their presence at diﬀerent levels of
the phylum are examined. All organisms, including unicellular such as protozoan, can display a speciﬁc reaction to danger. The
mechanisms enabling the appraisal of harmful stimuli are fully present in insects. In higher invertebrates, fear is associated with a
speciﬁc physiological response. In mammals, anxiety is accompanied by speciﬁc cognitive responses. The expression of emotions
diversiﬁes in higher vertebrates, only primates displaying facial expressions. Finally, autonoetic consciousness, a feature essential
for human anxiety, appears only in great apes. This evolutive feature parallels the progress in the complexity of the logistic systems
supporting it (e.g., the vegetative and central nervous systems). The ability to assess one’s coping potential, the diversiﬁcation of
the anxiety responses, and autonoetic consciousness seem relevant markers in a phylogenetic perspective.
Copyright © 2007 C. Belzung and P. Philippot. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
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1. INTRODUCTION
In human, anxiety is present in most psychopathological
conditions [1]. The regulation and alleviation of anxiety is a
key factor in the promotion of human well-being. However,
anxiety is often experienced as an automatic and uncontrol-
lable response with deep roots in our phylogenetic past. On
the other hand, psychological processes like rumination that
are central to human anxiety, imply high-order cognitive ca-
pacities, such as self-consciousness. It thus appears that anx-
iety comprises many facets, some of which having deep roots
in our evolutionary history and others being properly hu-
man. From this perspective, a phylogenetic approach to anx-
iety might deepen our understanding of this phenomenon in
human, and help to distinguish similarities and diﬀerences
with alike states in animals. Further, as progress in the un-
derstanding of the neurobiological substrates of anxiety and
in the discovery of new pharmacological treatments of anx-
iety often involves rodent models [2, 3], it is essential to be
aware of the processes that are absent in the animal species
used [4], in order to be aware of the limits of such models.
To achieve this goal, we used a comparative approach,
which consisted in assessing in animal species the presence
of the process described in psychology and thus designed for
humans. Such rationale provides operational criteria for the
study of emotions in animals and may be a heuristic frame-
work for interspecies comparison, which may be used also
for emotions other than fear and anxiety. This approach is
necessarily theoretical and requires to review many ﬁndings
obtained in animals research, trying to analyze data obtained
within other frames. To this aim, the present paper ﬁrst de-
scribes the diﬀerent elements constituting human anxiety
and examines their presence along the phylum. Then, it re-
views the diﬀerent neurological and physiological systems
of the organism supporting the anxiety responses along the
phylum. Finally, the diﬀerent conjunctions in a given species
of the elements constituting anxiety will be examined.
2. THE DEFINITION OF ANXIETY AND
RELATED CONCEPTS
Fear, anxiety, and panic are three related concepts that need
to be diﬀerentiated. Fear is considered by most emotion the-
orists as a basic emotion in humans (e.g., [5, 6]). As such,
fear would develop on the basis of an innate emotional
program that coordinates the diﬀerent facets of the organ-
ism response (e.g., expressive, physiological, or behavioural2 Neural Plasticity
responses) when confronted with an identiﬁed threat. Some
theorists have proposed that basic emotions are rather short-
lived, which distinguishes them from mood [5]. In this per-
spective,panichasbeenconceivedasaparoxysticfear,thatis,
a full-blownfearexpressed and experienced atthe maximum
of its possible intensity [1].
Inhumanpsychology,anxietyisoftenthoughtofasasec-
ondary emotion, this is, as an emotion in response to a pri-
mary emotional reaction [1, 7]. Anxiety would be the fear-
ful reaction to another emotion, be it, for instance, fear or
anger. For example, in panic disorder, anxiety is conceived as
the fear of the panic (fear) response. In anxiety, the stressor
is not always clearly identiﬁed, in contrast to what happens
in fear. Such deﬁnition implies that anxiety requires more
cognitive capacities than fear. Anxiety necessitates the capa-
bility to hold a representation of an emotional state and to
react to it. This representation might be rudimentary, for in-
stance, the reactivation of the emotional somatic state (e.g.
the concept of somatic marker [8]), but it constitutes a nec-
essary condition to anxiety. This implies that anxiety should
appear in higher species when compared to fear. This deﬁ-
nition parallels the conceptual construct that has been pro-
posed by Robert and Caroline Blanchard in animal research.
Indeed, these authors hold that the key factor distinguishing
fear from anxiety is the immediacy (or certainty) versus the
potentiality (uncertainty) of the threat and they deﬁne anxi-
ety as an anticipatory fear [9].
Fear and anxiety are complex phenomena that articulate
diﬀerent components. For example, when confronted with a
danger,asubjectmaydisplayaspeciﬁcresponsethatincludes
a behavioural component (e.g., ﬂight), a physiological one
(e.g., increase in heart rate), and an expressive one (speciﬁc
vocalization or facial expression).
As an emotion, anxiety supposedly orients the organ-
ism toward a speciﬁc type of interaction with its environ-
ment [10] and thus mobilizes the entirety of the organism
resources. In this perspective, anxiety comprises several el-
ements that constitute an emotion. These elements can be
categorized as, on the one hand, the diﬀerent facets of the
emotional response, and on the other hand, the diﬀerent lo-
gistic systemsof the organismthatprovide the biological and
neuronal supports to allow for these responses. In the next
sections, we will present these diﬀerent elements for the hu-
man species, and assess their presence across the phylum. By
taking this perspective, we, by no means, imply that humans
should be considered as the most accomplished species that
wouldsubsumealltheevolutionarygainofotherspeciesthat
would be located lower in the phylum. Rather, our perspec-
tive is a pragmatic one, taking as standard the species that we
know best; both from direct experience, and from accumu-
lated scientiﬁc work on emotion. We however hypothesize
that, as suggested by several emotion theorists, there might
be a trend to a complexity gain when going from species sit-
uated at a low level in the phylum (protozoan or some in-
vertebrates) to species situated at a higher phylogenetic level.
This paper may thus provide a heuristic approach, indicat-
ing which aspects of the emotion phenomenon are the most
relevant in a phylogenetic perspective.
3. THE FACETS OF ANXIETY AS AN
EMOTIONAL RESPONSE
3.1. Actiontendencies
In this section, we will present the diﬀerent facets that con-
stitute an emotion, focussing on fear, in the perspective that
anxiety is the fear of an emotional state.
Emotions have been conceived as action tendencies [10]
resulting from a speciﬁc appraisal of the situation. Appraisal
is the process by which an emotional meaning is attributed
to a situation. Appraisal does not necessarily imply complex
cognitive processes; it may consist in a very rudimentary in-
natedetectionofanunconditionedstimulus.Inthisperspec-
tive, individuals would constantly appraise external and in-
ternal stimuli in terms of their relevance for the organism
and intermsofthebehavioralreactionsthatmay berequired
as a response to those stimuli [11].
Whenarelevantstimulusisidentiﬁed,physiological,mo-
tor, and expressive response systems are activated, which
constitutes the action tendency. This concept refers to the
inner dispositions (or their absence) of performing certain
actions or achieving certain relational changes with the en-
vironment. In other words, an action tendency is the activa-
tion of abehavioural planaiming at changing the individual-
environment relation. Impulses of “moving towards,” “mov-
ing away,” and “moving against” are examples of action ten-
dencies [12]. The various types of action tendencies depend
upon the biological constitution of the organism. Hence the
phylogeny would bring along a number of such action ten-
dencies, organizing, for instance, defence and attack, protec-
tion, attention orientation, or inhibition. According to Frijda
[10, page 409], the basic emotions in human, such as those
proposed by Darwin [13], Tomkins [14], or Izard [6], are
the reﬂection of these action tendencies inherited from the
phylogeny. Of course, as it is the case for facial expression,
these innate programs could be modulated and accommo-
dated through learning.
Such actions tendencies can be found in a ubiquitous
manneracrossthephylum.Forexample,avoidanceofdanger
and ﬂight has been observed in protozoan such as paramecia
[15, 16], which suggests that a central nervous system is not
necessary as to the expression of such behaviours. In almost
all invertebrates such as molluscs or arthropods (insects or
crustaceans), speciﬁc behavioural responses can be observed
when a subject is faced by threat, including withdrawal from
the danger, absence of movement, and reduction of nonde-
fensive behaviours. For example, Aplysia californica,ag a s -
tropod mollusc, is able to react to a threatening stimulus by
escaping locomotion [17]. Further, lack of movement can be
observed in several insect species when faced by danger [18].
Finally, when confronted with threat, Aplysia displays a re-
duction of nondefensive behaviour such as feeding [17]. All
these behaviours are remarkably conserved through the phy-
lum and they are also observed in vertebrates including rep-
tiles, ﬁsh, birds, and mammals.
It is to be noted that, in humans, action tendencies are
not necessarily immediately enacted [10]. They would con-
stitute a preparation of the organism to react in a certain way,C. Belzung and P. Philippot 3
but the actual reaction would depend upon a suﬃcient acti-
vationoftheactiontendency.Thus,somespecieswouldben-
eﬁt from a buﬀer between the activation of a response mode
and its actual enactment. This is found in many species, in-
cluding invertebrates. For example, it has been shown that
environmental disturbances such as light, a drop of water, or
a pebble dropped in the aquarium induce a modiﬁcation of
the ventilatory rate and the heart rate in crustaceans such as
crayﬁsh. These modiﬁcations occur before the animal would
undergo behavioural activity. Further, in case the intensity of
the fearful stimulus is low, the animal will not display any
behavioural modiﬁcation. These physiological modiﬁcations
have been interpreted as indicative of an animal’s intention
for body movement before physical movement occurs [19].
3.2. Theappraisalcomponent
Regarding the appraisal or evaluation component, Scherer
[20] proposes a speciﬁc hierarchy of mechanisms for the on-
going appraisal of the environment and he presents speciﬁc
hypotheses regarding the pattern of evaluative meaning that
shouldprecedeparticularemotionalstates.Histheoryispar-
ticularly interesting in the present context as speciﬁc predic-
tions are made regarding the phylogenetic trend.
In human, speciﬁc emotions would be brought into play
by the operations of a series of ﬁve stimulus evaluation
checks (SECs). These checks are performed rapidly by mech-
anisms that continually scan the objects in the perceptual
ﬁeld, with diﬀerent patterns or outcomes of the check pro-
cess seen as giving rise to diﬀerent emotions. Based on logi-
cal,phylogenic,andontologicalarguments,Scherer[11]pos-
tulates that the SEC sequence order is ﬁxed, with the more
fundamental SECs in terms of adaptation coming ﬁrst. The
ﬁrst SECs could be found in very simple organisms with-
out neocortical processing capacities [11]. Thus, Scherer [11,
page 41] postulates that “rudimentary forms of the novelty,
intrinsic pleasantness, and even the need/goal signiﬁcance
checks are ‘hard-wired’,” suggesting that they can be genet-
ically transmitted, and thus conserved by evolution.
The ﬁrst SEC, “novelty check,” looks for potential
changes in the pattern of the situation. The orientation reﬂex
is one of its consequences. Scherer [11, page 306] states that,
in human, the novelty SEC is at least partly independent of
higher cortical functions and may result from preprocessing
in the brain stem or limbic structures. In other species, the
novelty check might be totally genetically determined and
independent of any neural system. This ability exists in an
ubiquitous way across the phylum, including in protozoan
and invertebrates. It can for example be detected using ha-
bituation: when an animal has been exposed repeatedly to a
new stimulation and has established that it is inconsequen-
tial, it is able to ignore it, a phenomenon termed as habitu-
ation. Habituation has been demonstrated in all organisms
across phylogeny including single-celled protozoa [10], in-
v e rt e b ra t e ss u c ha sn e m a t o d ea n c e s t ra lw o r mCaenorhabditis
elegans (which is much studied by neurobiologists because it
has a fully mapped nervous system comprising exactly 302
neurons) [22], insects such as fruit ﬂies [23], or mollusc such
as Aplysia [24], and vertebrates such as ﬁsh [25], rats[26], or
humans [27].
The second SEC is the “intrinsic pleasantness check.” On
the basis of innate feature detectors or of learned associa-
tions, this second SEC evaluates the pleasantness of the stim-
ulus or situation, hence determining approach or avoidance
[11]. Scherer [11] stresses that this check has to do with the
inherent pleasantness of a stimulus, and that it is not de-
pendent on stimulus relevance to the goals of the organism.
Again, in human, this SEC would be partly independent of
cortical structures and some of its processes might take place
in the amygdala. In other species, this check might be totally
determined by automatic processes. If an animal is able to
display either approach or avoidance of a stimulus present in
its surrounding, or to undergo appetitive or aversive learn-
ing, one may conclude that it possesses the ability to do this
check. According to some authors, the approach-avoidance
distinction is also applicable to organisms as simple as the
protozoa amoeba. In this case, approach and avoidance be-




more sophisticated invertebrates including ancestral worms
and insects. For example, the nematode Caenorhabditis el-
egans is able to display preferences for some stimuli over
others [29], to avoid noxious chemicals, high osmolarities,
acidic pH, and noxious mechanical stimuli [30], and to dis-
play aversive learning [31]. Insects such as drosophila dis-
play appetitive as well as aversive conditioning [32]. In fact,
Schneirla [28] argued that organisms at all levels of complex-
ity, ranging from protozoan to higher vertebrates, possess
what he termed A-type (approach-type) mechanisms, facili-
tating food-getting, shelter-getting, and mating, and W-type
(withdrawal-type) mechanisms, enabling defence, huddling,
ﬂight, and protection in general. He proposed that the so-
phistication of these mechanisms varies considerably across
the phylum, those of protozoa and invertebrates being rudi-
mentaryandrigid,andthoseofhigherorganismsbeingmore
complex and ﬂexible (see also [33, 34]). These two reactions
have survival value, as they move the organism toward ben-
eﬁcial stimuli and away from harmful stimuli [35,p a g e7 ]
and are therefore conserved from protozoan to higher verte-
brates.
Goals and needs of the organism come into play in the
thirdSEC,the“goal/needconductivenesscheck.”Itexamines
the extent to which the introduction of the detected stimulus
or event will advance or hinder the attainment of a speciﬁc
goal or the satisfaction of a need. The goal/need conductive-
ness check is divided into three subchecks: the relevance sub-
check that examines the relevance of the stimulus or event
for important goals/needs of the organism, the expectation
subcheck that determines the stimulus consistency with the
state expected at this point in the goals/needs sequence, and
the conductiveness subcheck that determines if the stimulus
is conducive or obstructive to the respective goals or needs.
This check can also be entirely genetically determined.
If a given animal is able to display speciﬁc behaviour to
escape stimuli that are incompatible with its survival such4 Neural Plasticity
as predators or high temperatures, one can consider that it
has this capacity. This can be seen in almost all invertebrate
species. For example, nonsegmented worms such as nema-
todes escape when exposed to temperature above 33◦C( f o ra
review on nematodes see [36] ) .O t h e ri n v e r t e b r a t eh a v es p e -
ciﬁc behaviours to escape predators: cuttleﬁsh can bury into
thesandtohidethemselvesfrompredators[37],grasshopper
may display immobility when confronted with a frog [38]a s
well as beetles when attacked by spiders [39]. This kind of
behaviour is also observed in protozoan. For example, cil-
iated protozoans such as Euplotes are able to change their
morphology [40]a n db e h a v i o u r[ 41] in response to preda-
tors [42]. Of course, these data do not enable to distinguish
the capabilities of these species regarding the diﬀerent sub-
checks of this appraisal component; such a detailed analysis
being beyond the scope of this review.
So, this third SEC has not been altered signiﬁcantly
through evolution, as it is described in invertebrates, and
e v e np r o t o z o a ns u c ha sc i l i a t e sa sw e l la sh i g h e rv e r t e b r a t e s .
This is probably related to the fact that it is essential to the
survival of the diﬀerent species. One should note that, at
the methodological level, the distinction between the sec-
ond (valence) and third (goal conductiveness) SEC might
notbepossibletooperateinlower-orderspecies.Beyondthis
methodological limitation, an alternative hypothesis should
be considered: this distinction might not be relevant. In
species low on the phylogenetic scale, these two SECs might
not be diﬀerentiated. Their distinction would only appear in
higher-order species.
These three ﬁrst checks have also been studied in an ex-
tensive and systematic way in some mammals, such as for
example lambs [43, 44]. These species display speciﬁc be-
havioural and physiological pattern of response when sub-
jected to environmental challenges characterized either by
novelty, by intrinsic pleasantness, or by having need/goal sig-
niﬁcance.
ThefourthSEC,the“copingpotentialcheck,”determines
the cause of the event, and the capacity of the organism to
control it or to confront it, or to adjust to the ﬁnal outcome.
If a species is able to react in a diﬀerent way in function of
the predictability/controllability of a signal, one may claim
that it has this ability. To our knowledge, no study has been
published addressing the presence of such processes in an-
cestral worms or protozoan. Ancestral worms such as nema-
todes possess the ability to assess the rhythmicity of some
events; this is necessary but probably not suﬃcient to pos-
sess the ability to react in function of the uncontrollability
of an event. Such changes of behaviour in function of the
controllability of a stimulus have been described in mam-
mals such as dogs by Overmier and Seligman [45]. Indeed,
in dogs, prior inescapable electric foot shock interferes with
later escape/avoidance learning in which shock is the neg-
ative reinforcer, a process termed as learned helplessness.
One may claim that if a species displays learned helpless-
ness, it might react in a diﬀerent way depending upon the
predictability/controllability of the situation. Learned help-
lessness has been described in various mammals including
dogs, rats, mice, cats, and sheep [45–53] but also in lower
vertebrates such as ﬁsh [54–56]. Further, insects such as
cockroachalsoexhibitafailuretoescapeshockwhenpossible
to do so following nonescapable/uncontrollable shocks [57–
59] in a similar way as vertebrates displaying learned help-
lessness. Therefore, one may claim that the “coping potential
check” may be present in several species across the animal
kingdom, including all vertebrates and some invertebrates
such as insects. However, no evidence exists in more rudi-
mentary invertebrates such as worms.
Finally, the last SEC, the “norm/self compatibility check,”
evaluates the congruence of the event with the social and
individual norms and standards such as mental prescrip-
tions, self-concept, and self-ideal. This check needs the pres-
ence of cultural transmission. The presence of culture in an-
imals such as nonhuman primates is still debated. Some au-
thors claim that “proto-cultures” or “traditions” (deﬁned as
“long-lasting behavioral practices shared among members of
a group partly via social learning,” see [60]) can be observed
in animals. This for example has been ﬁrst described in the
early ﬁfties [61] in a group of Japanese macaques (Macaca
fuscata), a species displaying acquisition of innovative be-
haviours, such as potato and wheat-washing, ﬁrst displayed
by a young female and then transmitted to social partners as
well as to successive generations [62]. In chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), behavioural variants (traditions) have been de-
scribed in diﬀerent communities, such as diﬀerences in tool
usage, grooming and courtship behaviours [63]. However,
all authors would not agree that these traditions can corre-
spond to the cultural transmission seen in humans. Accord-
ing to Donald [64], humans have three cognitive processes
(mimetic skill, language, and external symbols) not available
to other primates and enabling such a transmission. Oth-
ers propose that sophisticated forms of imitation that are
only described in humans are necessary for cultural trans-
mission [65]. Similarly, some argue that culture is a uniquely
human form of social learning, requiring imitative learn-
ing, instructed learning (teaching), and collaborative learn-
ing, three social-cognitive processes emerging in human on-
togeny [66].
The pattern of the outcome of the diﬀerent SECs de-
termines a particular emotional meaning and directly ac-
tivates the corresponding action tendency. In human anx-
iety, the central features are that aspects of the situation
are evaluated as intrinsically negative (intrinsic pleasant-
ness check), as threatening important goals of the organism
(e.g., survival, or social acceptation in a gregarious species)
(goal/need conductiveness check), and as unpredictable or
uncontrollable (coping potential check). Thus, to experience
full-blown anxiety, a species would need to have the capacity
for the ﬁrst four SECs deﬁned by Scherer’s theory. As previ-
ously shown, all these four checks seem to be present in an
ubiquitous manner in the diﬀerent phyla, from invertebrates
such as insects to lower vertebrates (ﬁsh) and mammals and
even, for some of them, in unicellular organisms such as pro-
tozoan. Therefore, according to this theoretical frame, some
rudimentary form of anxiety may be present from inverte-
brates to humans. However, as we will see, the level of so-
phistication, as well as of awareness of these evaluations andC. Belzung and P. Philippot 5
of the resulting experience vary tremendously from species
to species, according to their cognitive capabilities.
3.3. Thephysiologicalcomponent
As action tendencies, emotion and anxiety recruit all the lo-
gistic capacities of the organism. The physiological systems
are activated in order to support the actions and transac-
tions with the environment called for by the emotional sit-
uation. In humans, many physiological and endocrine re-
sponseshavebeenobservedinemotionandinanxietyinpar-
ticular.Thereisstilladebateregardingwhetherspeciﬁcemo-
tions (and anxiety can be considered as such) have unique
physiologicalcharacteristics.Despiteacenturylongtradition
ofphysiologicalresearchinhumanemotion,nodeﬁnitecon-
clusion has been reached yet [67]. Physiological responses in
human emotions seem to result from a complex interaction
between the demand of the situation, personality character-
istics, and the type of regulation strategies used in that situa-
tion [68].
Regarding fear and anxiety, meta-analyses of the liter-
ature have documented marked changes in most periph-
eral responses: cardiovascular changes, respiratory changes,
muscles tonicity changes, or skin temperature changes when
compared to neutral states [67]. These changes are driven by
the autonomic nervous system. These changes, however, are
not that diﬀerent from other intense emotions such as anger,
with the exception that anger produces more elevated dias-
tolic blood pressure.
Most of these reactions are present in rodents such as
rats, and they can vary as a function of the behavioural re-
sponse that the subject may display. For example, a ﬂight re-
sponse can occur in response to threat that is associated with
increased blood pressure and tachycardia, enhanced cardiac
output and respiration, increased cerebral perfusion and re-
distribution of blood ﬂow to increase limb circulation [69–
72]. Some aspects of these responses are also observed in
lower vertebrates such as ﬁshes. Indeed, salmons show ﬂight
associated with increased heart rate when confronted with a
simulated predator attack [73]. Other components, such as
variations in skin temperature or skin conductance are diﬃ-
cult to measure without stressing the animals, so that the few
empirical studies that assessed these modiﬁcations were only
done in mammals using radiotelemetry. For example, a de-
creaseinskintemperaturefollowingalertingstimulihasbeen
shown in monkeys in diﬀerent parts of the body including
the nose, nasal mucosa, ears, hands, feet, and tail [74]. Such
temperature variations according to fear or anxiety are log-
ically absent in lower vertebrates, which are poikilothermic.
Other aspects of the human physiological response to threat
are not present in lower vertebrates. For example, ﬁshes, am-
phibians, and reptiles do not have dilatator musculature in-
nervating the iris so that they may not exhibit mydriasis.
Evenifnotpossessinganautonomicnervoussystemsim-
ilar to the one enabling the physiological response to dan-
ger seen in vertebrates, invertebrates need the same rapid
cardiovascular and respiratory regulation to be primed for
the defensive behaviours they exhibit toward threatening
stimuli. Indeed, such modiﬁcations provide the organism
with the metabolic/energetic resources that will be neces-
sary to deal with environmental challenges. Are such physio-
logical responses observed in invertebrates when confronted
with danger? Are they associated with the behavioural re-
sponse? In crustaceans, perception of changes in the sur-
roundings of the animal can induce modiﬁcations of some
physiological variables such as heart rate and ventilatory rate
[19]. This is also seen in molluscs such as cephalopods. For
example, octopus displays cardiac arrests when exposed to
a stressful situation [75]. Thus, the physiological responses
observed in some invertebrates such as crustaceans or mol-
luscs faced by threatening stimuli are very close to the re-
sponses of vertebrates mediated by the autonomic nervous
system [76]. In other invertebrates such as insects, the energy
necessary to cope with threat is provided to the organism by
other means. For example, in insects, the blood ﬂow to the
diﬀerent tissues is not regulated by an increase of the heart
rate. Indeed, insects have an open circulatory system that
diﬀers from the closed circulatory system (in which blood
is always contained within vessels) found in vertebrates. In
an open system, blood (termed as hemolymph) ﬂows freely
within the body and establishes direct contact with all in-
ternal tissues. In case of danger, hemolymph delivery to the
tissue is directly increased, without a modiﬁcation of heart
rate. However, even if modiﬁcations in heart rate have not
been documented in fear-challenging situations, behavioural
activity induces modiﬁcation in heart rate (C. Lazzari, per-
sonal communication). As fear is associated with modiﬁca-
tion of activity, it can thus be that it is related to heart rate
modiﬁcations.
Thus, it is possible that the representation of the
body changes occurring during danger may be very dif-
ferent depending on the species: mammals may perceive
environmental-induced changes driven by the autonomic
nervous system in their body and including modiﬁcations in
heart and ventilatory rate, in skin temperature, and mydri-
asis, lower vertebrates (amphibians, reptiles, ﬁsh) and some
invertebrates (crustaceans, molluscs) may exhibit modiﬁed
heart and ventilatory rate without changes in temperature or
mydriasis.
3.4. Theexpressivecomponent
Emotions are not only inner states. They are also commu-
nicated to the environment, as they convey the behavioural
intend of the individual. In human, the expressive compo-
nent has certainly been the most studied, at least for facial
expression. A series of studies has demonstrated innate and
cross-cultural aspects of emotional facial expressions in hu-
mans. However, these innate facial displays are modulated by
a set of cultural and display rules [77, 78]. The gist of this
literature is that the nonverbal communication of emotion
serves very important functions of regulation, both within
the species and cross-species. It is conceived of, primarily, as
a social process.
While much work has been devoted to the facial display
of fear, the literature in human is almost silent regarding6 Neural Plasticity
a facial expression that would be speciﬁc to anxiety. Most
scholars do not distinguish facial expression between these
two states [6, 79]. Similarly, the studies that have investigated
modulations of prosody during emotional states did not dis-
tinguish fear from anxiety [80, 81]. Yet, emotional prosody
in humans has clear phylogenetic roots that have been traced
back to primates [82]. This point will be developed in the
following paragraphs.
An interesting phenomenon for emotion regulation,
known as facial feedback, has been documented in humans
[78, 79]. A wealth of research has established that holding
a certain nonverbal expression was generating or reinforc-
ing the corresponding aﬀect. Thus holding a nonverbal ex-
pression of anxiety generates and intensiﬁes this emotion.
Phenomenon of contagion via mimicry has also been doc-
umented [83–85].
In humans, some studies have documented that diﬀerent
emotions were expressed by diﬀerent postures (e.g., [86]).
Further, Stepper and Strack [87] have documented that ma-
nipulating posture has an impact on the emotional subjec-
tive feeling state and aﬀects later judgment of valenced ma-
terial. Further, there is some evidence that body odours are
modulated by emotion, including fear and anxiety. For in-
stance, Chen and Haviland-Jones [88]h a v ec o l l e c t e du n d e r -
armodoursongazepadsinhumansubjectsexposedtoajoy-
ful or a frightening movie. The authors have observed that,
ontheonlybasisofthecollectedodours, humanparticipants
could detect above chance level the emotion induced.
In animals too, emotional state can be communicated to
the environment by speciﬁc signals, including facial, postu-
ral, vocal, or chemical ones. Further, other kind of expressive
components are also documented, including more speciﬁc
ones such as camouﬂaging.
Modiﬁcation of facial expression in relationship to emo-
tions can be seen only in species having a well-developed
facial musculature. Facial musculature is highly conserved
across primates [89], the one of chimpanzee being almost
identical to that of humans [90]. Indeed, in this species, spe-
ciﬁc facial expressions have been described in response to
danger such as fear grin. However, even if some spare evi-
dence indicates that some mammals such as rats are able to
display some speciﬁc facial expression to the aﬀective aspects
of taste [91], the facial musculature of nonprimate mammals
isundevelopedornonexistent[89,92,93]andmaynotallow
more speciﬁc facial expressions.
Postural changes have been extensively described in
higher vertebrates confronted with danger. For example, ro-
dent may display a posture characterized by immobility, ﬂat-
tening of the ears, piloerection, and marked mydriasis. In-
deed, speciﬁc postures have been repeatedly seen in verte-
brates in emotional situations: they have been nicely illus-
trated by Darwin [13].
Speciﬁc vocalizations to threat have also been docu-
mented across the phylum. For example, vervet monkeys
emit speciﬁc alarm calls to diﬀerent predators such as leop-
ards,eagles,orpythons[94].Variationinalarmcallswiththe
type of predator has also been described in rodents such as
gerbils [95]. In other species, these calls are less sophisticated
as they may indicate the presence of a danger to congeners,
withoutgivingmoreinformationontheprecisenatureofthe
threat. Speciﬁc vocalizations to danger have been described
in birds [96], but also in amphibians (e.g., crocodiles [97])
and ﬁsh [98]; they are thus present across the vertebrate phy-
lum. Further, such calls have also been described in inverte-
brates such as insects. For example, Wyttenbach et al. [99]
showed that ﬁeld crickets emit ultrasonic signals in the 25–
80 kHz range when confronted with predators, inducing es-
capebehaviourinothercrickets.However,allsignalsemitted
by these crickets do not elicit the same response: when they
produce signals in the 4–5 kHz, conspeciﬁcs approach, in-
dicating the speciﬁcity of these alarm calls. So, vocal expres-
sions related to danger can be seen in vertebrates as well as in
invertebrates.
The use of pheromones to alert conspeciﬁcs of the pres-
ence of a danger is common in many animal species. For ex-
ample, in the presence of an intruder, several species of so-
cial hymenoptera secrete pheromones that cause defensive
behaviour among conspeciﬁcs [100]. Such reactions can be
found in vertebrates as well. For example, carnivorous mam-
mals of the Mustelidae family use anal scent glands to pro-
duce olfactory warning, often repellents signals [101]. Fear
may be communicated by odours in mice and rats as well
[102]. Such reaction can also be documented in nonhuman
primates. Indeed, it has been shown that the genital scent
glands of two prosimian primates are involved in producing
af e a rs c e n t[ 103].
Camouﬂaging can be considered as a form of behaviour
intermediate between emotional expression and coping with
the situation. Indeed, it often appears when a species is con-
fronted with a danger such as a predator. The most common
form of it involves the modiﬁcation of the visual appear-
ance, but calls, songs, and scents can also be changed. Dif-
ferent strategies of camouﬂaging have been described, such
as crypsis, aposematism, M¨ ullerian mimicry, and Batesian
mimicry. Crypsis enables to minimize the signal to noise ra-
tio, thus rendering the detection of the subject very diﬃcult
for a predator. It generally consists in matching colours and
patternsbetweenananimalanditsbackground[104–106].It
is very common in invertebrates such as arthropods (e.g., in
insects) or molluscs (e.g., in cephalopods) as well as in some
vertebrates such as ﬁshes, amphibians, reptiles, and birds.
For example, the day octopus (Octopus cyanea), which for-
age on coral reefs, produce colour patterns capable of instan-
taneous matching to backgrounds from sand and reef rub-
ble, through to spiked corals and seaweeds. More rarely, this
kindofdefencestrategycanalsobeseeninmammals.Forex-
ample, in the rock pocket mice Chaetodipus intermedius and
in the deer mouse Peromyscus maniculatus, variation in coat
colour, as a function of the colour of rock substrate, has been
documented. This strategy is adaptive, providing the mice
cryptic protection against predators [107]. The other cam-
ouﬂaging strategies (aposematism, M¨ ullerian mimicry, and
Batesian mimicry) are based on a maximization of the sig-
nal to noise ratio. Aposematism consists in displaying warn-
ing signals (e.g., conspicuous coloration) informing a poten-
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many invertebrates, but also in ﬁshes, amphibians, snakes,
and birds [108]. Batesian mimicry is a form of mimicry in
which an innocuous unprotected species closely resembles
a noxious model species. Hoverﬂies that resemble bees or
waspsareanexample.Thiscaninvolvethecolorationpattern
as well as some aspects of the animal’s posture. For example,
theIndo-Malaysianoctopuscanadoptacolourandaposture
mimickingapoisonousseasnake.InMullerianmimicry,two
or more equally poisonous species share an identical colour
pattern, thereby reinforcing the warning each gives to preda-
tors. In some cases, dynamic camouﬂage can be observed:
some insects imitate the movements of branches or leaves in
their surrounding.
3.5. Cognitivemode
In human psychology, extensive research has documented
that emotion in general, and anxiety in particular, are ac-
companied by speciﬁc cognitive response. Threat and anx-
iety have been shown to powerfully aﬀect attention alloca-
tion. Laboratory studies have documented that threatening
stimuli automatically attract attention, even during sublim-
inal exposure (very rapid presentation that cannot be con-
sciously perceived) (for a review, see [109]). In people suf-
fering from chronic anxiety, this pattern would be even more
pronounced and aggravated by a poor capacity to disengage
attentionfromthreat.Infact,mostmodels ofhumananxiety
(e.g., [110]) consider that an attentional bias toward threat
is an essential component of anxiety, especially of dysfunc-
tional anxiety.
Attention bias toward anxiogenic stimuli has rarely been
examined as such in nonhuman animal species. However,
diﬀerentphenomenahavebeendescribedinanimalsthatcan
be interpreted within this frame, including fear-potentiated
startle, increased cognitive performance in stressful situa-
tions, anxiety-induced increased attention toward negative
stimuli and a bias for threat cues in anxious mice.
Fear-potentiated startle corresponds to an increase of the
amplitude of the acoustic startle response in the presence of
a cue previously paired with a shock. It has been described in
rhesus monkeys [111]b u ta l s oi nr o d e n t ss u c ha sr a t s[ 112]
or mice [113]. To our knowledge, fear-potentiated startle has
not been examined in nonmammalian vertebrates such as
birds or ﬁshes.
Another phenomenon that has been widely documented
is the increased mnesic performance observed in anxiogenic
situations: this is generally attributed to the fact that anx-
iogenic situations increase attention, thus increasing mnesic
encoding. This facilitation has been repeatedly observed in
rodents such as mice but also in birds. The processes used to
increase anxiety include pharmacological manipulations, le-
sions studies, maternal separation in pups, genetic invalida-
tion, and strain variations. For example, a principal compo-
nent analysis showed that, in mice, higher emotional mem-
ory performance is related to heightened state anxiety [114].
Further, Venault et al. [115] showed that, in rodents but
also in chickens, anxiogenic compounds increased mem-
ory in three diﬀerent tasks, while anxiolytic drugs elicited
opposite eﬀects. However, this association is probably not
causal, as β-CCT, a selective benzodiazepine receptor antag-
onist, blocks the antianxiety but not the amnesic action of
benzodiazepines in mice [116], suggesting that the anxiolytic
and the amnesic eﬀects of these compounds are indepen-
dent. In mice, a multiple regression analyses also revealed a
relationship between attention toward salient stressful stim-
uli in a conditioned task and sensitivity to stress [117], sug-
gesting that attention toward negative events may contribute
to the response in stressful situations. Finally, when mice
characterized by heightened anxiety-like behaviour are sub-
jected to a fear conditioning protocol including a fully con-
ditioned stimulus (a tone always followed by a shock) and a
partial conditioned stimulus (a light, only partially related
to the shock), normal mice discriminate between the par-
tialandthefullconditionedstimulus,whiletheanxiousmice
show the same response to the two stimuli [118]. This phe-
nomenon has been interpreted as a bias for threat cues.
Most of these studies suggesting an attentional bias to-
ward threat in anxious animals have been conducted in
mammals, specially rodents, the sole exception being the
pharmacological studies that were also conducted in birds.
Even if the absence of such studies does by no ways mean
that such processes do not exist in lower vertebrates, it sug-
geststhatitisatleastdiﬃculttoassessinﬁsh,amphibians,or




In the human literature, an important component of emo-
tion is of phenomenological nature: the subjective feeling
state. It reﬂects the notion that, when emotional, the indi-
viduals feel in a diﬀerent state that colours their perception
of the world and of themselves. Most authors agree that the
subjective feeling component results from the global percep-
tion by the individual of the changes operating in the dif-
ferent emotion facets [119]. There is also a consensus on
the fact that the subjective feeling state can vary in terms of
awareness.Forinstance,Lane[120]hasidentiﬁedseverallev-
els of awareness of emotion, from a diﬀuse sense of bodily
changes, to the reﬂexive awareness of observing oneself in an
emotional state. These diﬀerent levels of awareness are sup-
ported by diﬀerent brain structures. They supposedly pro-
gressively appear during the ontogenesis, with the highest
level of awareness fully mastered only at adolescence.
Reﬂexive emotional awareness is particularly relevant for
emotion regulation in general and anxiety in particular. This
capacity enables humans, not only to be reﬂexively aware of
their on-going experiences, but also to reactivate past experi-
ences, or to imagine future ones [121]. The capacity for self-
consciousness, labelled autonoetic consciousness by Tulving
[122], is the central element that allows remembering spe-
ciﬁc past experiences (i.e., episodic memory) as well as for
imagining what future experience would feel like. As a form
of anxiety consists in an apprehension for a future emotion
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a future experience would feel like. Hence, possessing auto-
noetic awareness capacities opens many avenues for anxiety
to develop. For instance, for a student, the capacity to imag-
ine a future examination creates a source of anxiety. On the
contrary, it has been observed that people who, because of
cerebral damage in the frontal and prefrontal regions, lack
any autonoetic capacities (for a review, see [121]) are unable
to experience any anxiety.
The capacity for autonoetic consciousness is one of the
last cognitive features to develop in the human ontogeny. Its
ﬁrst manifestation in terms of reﬂexive capacities to one’s
own experience appears around 4 years of age and it is be-
lievedtobeonlyfullydevelopedaround14yearsofage[121].
To date, the evidence for autonoetic consciousness in non-
human primates is still the object of a debate [123]. This
debate is further fuelled by the fact that the exact cognitive
processes leading to autonoetic awareness are still to be iden-
tiﬁed. However, the brain regions involved, as well as the im-
portant cognitive resources required, strongly suggest an im-
portant involvement of executive processes.
As autonoetic consciousness is a key feature of episodic
memory [122], the development of episodic memory across
speciesmightshedsomelightonthebirthofautonoeticcon-
sciousness along the phylum. Several reviews of this question
have been proposed (e.g., [123, 124]). However, it should be
stressed that autonoetic consciousness does not only imply
the capacities to remember “what, when, and where” a spe-
ciﬁc event occurred. This lattercapacity seemsto be acquired
early in the phylum, as it is already mastered by birds [123].
Rather, autonoetic consciousness also implies the capacity
of representing oneself as the subject of the experience re-
membered. This latter facet implies self-awareness. This ca-
pacity seems to appear very late in the phylum. According
to Gallup et al. [125], self-awareness can be reﬂected by self-
recognition and by the ability to infer mental states in oth-
ers. Indeed, according to these authors, if a subject is able
to have a representation of itself, it may possess the ability
to identify itself (self-recognition) and to use its own expe-
rience to infer comparable experience in others (a process
termedasmentalstateattributionortheoryofmind).There-
fore, self-recognition and mental state attribution could be
heuristic indicators of self-awareness. Gallup [126]d e v e l -
oped a paradigm enabling to test self-recognition in great
apes: the capacity to interpret one’s own reﬂection in a mir-
ror. It has been shown that mirror self-recognition exists in
chimpanzees [126, 127], but also in other great apes includ-
ing orangutans and bonobos [128, 129]. Interestingly, this
c a p a c i t yh a sn o tb e e ns e e ni ns o m eg r e a ta p e ss u c ha sg o -
rillas [128, 130]o ri nm o n k e y ss u c ha sm a c a q u e s[ 126]. Fur-
ther, self-recognition has also been shown in great apes us-
ing other paradigms [131]; however, it was never observed
in other nonhuman primates, suggesting a phylogenetic gap
for this process between great apes and other nonhuman pri-
m a t e ss u c ha sm a c a q u e s .
It should however be noticed here that the assumption
that great apes are able of self-recognition of their image in a
mirrorhasbeenquestionedbysomeauthors,andisstillmat-
ter of controversy. Indeed, according to some authors (see,
e.g., [132]), the behaviour of these primates when faced with
a mirror could instead have occurred by chance or result
from experimental artefacts. On the other hand, evidence
of mental state attribution in animals is still matter of con-
troversy. It seems that this process appears very late in the
phylum. Scarce evidence indicates that chimpanzee may be
able to take into account what other chimpanzee can or can-
not see [133]; however, this question remains a contentious
issue [132]. So, some controversial evidence indicates that
g r e a ta p e ss u c ha sc h i m p a n z e e s ,b o n o b o s ,a n do r a n g u t a n s
may possess some abilities such as self-recognition, that re-
ﬂect self-awareness, a process necessary for autonoetic con-
sciousness. However, at this point, prudence is necessary be-
cause this by no means indicates that they possess autonoetic
consciousness. This just means that they have some abilities
enabling this kind of consciousness.
4. THE LOGISTIC SYSTEMS OF THE ORGANISM
SUPPORTING THE ANXIETY RESPONSE
In humans, the anxiety response is supported by several bio-
logicalsystems,includingneurotransmitterssuchasbiogenic
amines, stress hormones, activity driven by the autonomic
n e r v o u ss y s t e m ,a n dc h a n g e sw i t h i ns p e c i ﬁ cb r a i na r e a s .A r e
these diﬀerent features present at all levels of the phylum?
Fear triggers the release of various biogenic amines, in-
cluding the catecholamines adrenaline, noradrenalin, oc-
topamine, and dopamine and the indolamine serotonin.
Adrenaline, noradrenalin, and dopamine have been de-
scribedinallvertebrates,withsomevariationsthathavebeen
suggested to be related to an evolutive trend [134]. Indeed,
high noradrenalin/adrenaline ratio appears to be character-
istic of more primitive vertebrates while a lower ratio occurs
in tetrapods and mammalian adults. In invertebrates, all cat-
echolamines have been detected in several insects, but also
in scorpions as well as in gastropods and cephalopods [135].
Serotonin has also been detected in several invertebrates in-
cludingarthropodssuchasscorpions,insects,orcrustaceans,
or molluscs such as cephalopods [136–140]. Are these bio-
genic amines released under stressful situation similar to the
ones triggering fear and/or anxiety? This seems to be the
case. For example, stress elicits an increase in noradrenalin
and dopamine in oysters: this response occurs rapidly and its
intensity is correlated with the intensity of the stress [141].
Consequently, one may claim that there are only small varia-
tions across the phylum as to the biogenic amines.
Fearandanxietyalsoproducesomespeciﬁchormonalre-
lease, related to the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis, including a release of several stress
hormones such as corticotropic-releasing hormone (CRH),
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), and glucocorticoids.
Stress hormones seem also highly conserved across the an-
imal kingdom. Indeed, CRH has been described in vari-
ous mammals but also in birds such as pigeons and quails,
frogs, and several ﬁsh species (elasmobranch ﬁsh, teleosts,
goldﬁsh, salmons, eel). Such molecules are not only found
in vertebrates. Indeed, CRH-like molecules have been re-
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of the annelid Dendrobaena subrubicunda, the insect Peri-
planeta americana, and the mollusc Planorbarius corneus
(for a review, see [142]). ACTH release from hypothala-
mic centres has been observed in birds, amphibians, and
teleost ﬁsh. With regard to invertebrates, ACTH-like com-
pounds are found in the nervous system of various mol-
luscs and insects, but also in the protozoan Tetrahymena
pyriformis (for a review, see [142]). Therefore, this com-
pound or its functional equivalent is present at quasi all lev-
els of the phyla. In mammals, glucocorticoids such as cor-
ticosterone or cortisol are released by the adrenals, a gland
consisting of an outer part (the adrenal cortex) and an in-
ner part (the adrenal medulla). Nonmammalian vertebrates
lack the typical anatomical adrenal gland of mammals, but
they are equipped with cells resembling mammalian cells of
the adrenal cortex. Corticosterone has been detected in some
birds such as chickens or ducks, reptilians, amphibians, and
ﬁsh but also in some invertebrates, particularly insects (for a
review, see [142]). So, again, there are very few variations in
stress hormones across the phylum.
The phylogeny of the autonomic nervous system has
beenextensivelystudiedbyNilsson[143,144].Itappearsthat
this system is more or less the same in all vertebrate species,
with the exception of the lower ﬁshes (cyclostomes) that do
not have the double cardiac innervation (noradrenergic and
cholinergic) that all the other vertebrate species have (from
higher ﬁshes to mammals). Invertebrates do not have auto-
nomicnervoussystemasvertebrates;however,pastworkun-
dertaken by comparative neuroanatomists such as Zavarzin
[145]drewsimilarities betweenthesympathetic nervoussys-
tem of vertebrates and the unpaired nerves of insects.
Another important system supporting the human anx-
iety response is the facial musculature, enabling the facial
expression of emotions. Such musculature is not present
in invertebrates having an external skeleton, such as insects
or bivalves. In nonmammalian vertebrates, this musculature
is very rudimentary, enabling only opening and closing of
the apertures such as mouth, eyes, and nostrils [146, 147].
Greater mobility of the lips can be seen in mammals, prob-
ably because this may facilitate suckling [148]. In primates,
facial musculature gains in complexity as speciﬁc muscles
appear that enable emotional facial expression (e.g., zygo-
maticus major, zygomaticus minor, levator labii superioris,
depressor angulioris, depressor labii inferioris, and risorius)
[148]. The facial musculature is innervated by neurons orig-
inating from the craniofacial motor nuclei (VII) of the brain
stem. According to Sherwood et al. [146], a basic pattern
of muscle representation in the craniofacial motor nuclei is
strongly conserved across mammals. However, counting of
the number of neurons in these areas shows that hominids
(great apes and humans) have 24% more facial neurons than
predicted from their medulla size, indicating a larger devel-
opment of this structure in great apes and humans. Further,
in old world anthropoid primates, cortical neurons originat-
ing in the motor cortex and projecting directly to cranial
nervemotoneuronshavebeendescribed:thereisnoevidence
of such direct projections in other mammals [146, 147].
These projections may enhance volitional control over facial
expression.So,facialmusculatureandthestructurethatcon-
trol it are mostly described in higher primates such as great
apes and humans.
Several functional neuroimaging studies have investi-
gated the brain structure whose activity is modiﬁed dur-
ing fearful experience. For example, activation of the amyg-
dala has been observed during acquisition of conditioned
fear [149]. This involvement of the amygdala has then been
largely conﬁrmed [150]. Further, during fear conditioning,
an activation of the anterior cingulate cortex is also observed
and, in case of trace fear conditioning, an additional ac-
tivation of the hippocampus has been documented [151].
These authors suggest that the hippocampus may enable the
storage of the spatiotemporal aspects of the fear experience,
while the anterior cingulate cortex may permit to drive at-
tentional resources toward the stimulus and to anticipate the
occurrence of the fearful stimulus. Other studies focused on
brain activation during anticipation of fear. They showed
that during anticipation, subjects report fear experience as-
sociated with activation of the physiological variables related
to fear. Further, these studies revealed that during anticipa-
tion, there was an activation of the prefrontal cortex [152]
(particularly of the orbitofrontal cortex [153]), of the tem-
poral area [153, 154], and of the insulae [153]. Finally, when
subjects are requested to try to self-generate emotions by re-
experiencing past events, they show a decreased activation
of the hypothalamus, of the posterior cingulate cortex, and
of the orbitofrontal cortex and an increased activity in sec-
ondary somatosensorial cortices, in the insulae, and in the
hippocampus [155]. Interestingly, some of these modiﬁca-
tions are observed in areas enabling the perception and the
regulation of body internal states (somatosensorial areas and
insulae). So, these studies show that several brain areas are
engaged in humans during fear or anxiety, including subcor-
tical ones (hypothalamus, amygdale, hippocampus) and cor-
tical ones (prefrontal cortex, somatosensorial areas, insulae,
cingulate cortex).
Is such a pattern of activation also observed in other
species? How does the anatomy of these brain areas evolve
across the phylum? We will answer these questions mainly
focusing on vertebrates, as the nervous system is organized
in a diﬀerent manner in invertebrates making a comparative
approach diﬃcult.
Wewillﬁrstconsiderthephylogenyofthehypothalamus,
the amygdale, and the hippocampus. The hypothalamus is a
very old area and unlike most other brain structures, it has
been conserved throughout phylogeny and exists in all ver-
tebrates, including ﬁshes. Amygdala and hippocampus have
not been described as such in ﬁshes; however, on the basis
of anatomical and developmental data, it has been suggested
that the ﬁsh medial and lateral regions of the telencephalic
palliamightbethehomologousneuralstructuretothemam-
malian amygdala and hippocampus, respectively [156–159].
Further, these areas seem to be associated with functions
that are also homologous to the ones of limbic structures
in higher vertebrates. Indeed, several recent studies showed
that medial and lateral pallium ablation in ﬁshes induces a
deﬁcit in fear and spatial learning, respectively [160–162].10 Neural Plasticity
In amphibians, similar results are obtained as the medial pal-
lium appears to be homologous with the hippocampus of
mammals [163]. Further, in these species, the basic subdi-
visions and connections of the amygdalar nuclei found in
mammals and described [164] as structures homologous to
the lateral, medial [165], and central [164] amygdala have
been recently identiﬁed within the ventral part of the lat-
eral pallium. Finally, the posterior dorsal ventricular ridge of
amphibians has aﬀerents and eﬀerents similar to the ones of
the basolateral amygdala of mammals [166]. This can also
be seen in reptiles [167, 168]. In birds, the hippocampal for-
mation is considered to be homologous to the mammalian
hippocampus [169] and the posterior and medial archistria-
tum is considered as a homolog of the amygdala in mam-
mals [170]. In mammals such as rodents, the amygdala as
well as the hippocampus are largely equivalent to the ones
of primates in their connectivity, neuroanatomy, and func-
tion. The role of hippocampus in trace and contextual fear
conditioningiswellestablished[171–174].Further,thefunc-
tion of the diﬀerent subdivisions of the amygdala in fear and
anxiety is largely described, the lateral and central parts be-
ing involved in classical fear conditioning [175–178] and the
medial nucleus being mostly related to unconditioned fear
[179, 180]. So, in vertebrates, the subcortical structures im-
plicated in fear and/or anxiety have been well conserved, the
hypothalamus being present in all species, and regions ho-
mologous to the hippocampus and amygdala being present,
and functionally activated during fear, in ﬁshes. In higher
vertebrates, a suborganization of these areas appears, sub-
serving speciﬁc functions.
We now consider the phylogeny of the neocortical areas
(prefrontal cortex, secondary somatosensorial areas, insulae,
cingulate cortex) involved in the human anxiety. The classi-
cal view concerning the origins of the mammalian neocortex
considers that it may be inexistent in nonmammalian verte-
brates such as birds or reptiles. In fact, a three-layered cor-
tex has been described in reptiles [181, 182] and some au-
thors claim that neuronal populations homologous to the
ones found in the mammalian neocortex are seen in the
avian/reptilian dorsal ventricular ridge [183]. However, this
view is contested. The following paragraphs discuss the pres-
ence of these areas in mammals, and mention some debates
regarding their functional equivalents in birds.
In rats, the frontal cortex is subdivided into three topo-
logically diﬀerent regions: the medial prefrontal cortex (that
includes the anterior cingulate), the orbital prefrontal cor-
tex, and the agranular insular cortex [184]. Rats have also a
distinct secondary somatosensory cortex. All these areas are
activated by anxiogenic stimulus (see, e.g., [185]), suggest-
ing that they are involved in fear and anxiety. However, rats
may not have exactly the same neural representation of fear
as primates. Indeed, recently, some features that seem to be
unique in primates have also been described. For example, it
has been shown that activity within the right anterior insula
correlates with conscious awareness of the bodily responses
occurring during emotional states (e.g., heartbeat detection)
suggesting that this area may provide a substrate for subjec-
tive feeling states [186, 187]. Interestingly, this region has a
speciﬁc pattern of aﬀerents enabling this function (e.g., the
thalamocortical lamina 1 pathway) that is only developed in
primates [188], suggesting that awareness of visceral changes
relatedtoemotionsmayonlyexistinprimates.Further,these
projections are small in macaques, and their size develops
mainly in great apes. In the anterior cingulate cortex, some
speciﬁc neurons termed as spindle cells have been described
t h a ta r ep r e s e n to n l yi nh u m a n sa n dg r e a ta p e s[ 189]; they
have been suggested to be involved in emotional self-control
and problem-solving capacity [190]. Further, some speciﬁc
aﬀerents of these areas such as the ancillary thalamocortical
lamina 1 pathway are also speciﬁc to primates. Within the
prefrontal cortex, there is also another area that is unique
in great apes and humans: Brodmann’s area 10. This area
may be involved “in the retrieval of memories from the in-
dividual’s past experience and the capacity to plan adaptive
responses” [191] which may be essential to autonoetic con-
sciousness.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Table 1 presents in a simpliﬁed way a summary of the data
presented in the previous sections. A clear evolutive trend
appears, as the components of the emotional processes as
well as the logistical systems related to their realization gain
in complexity from lower to higher levels of the phylum.
Further, it can be noticed that the species located higher in
the phylogenetic tree, while gaining some additive abilities
(cognitive bias, autonoetic consciousness), never loose the
more primitive capabilities they share with the lower inverte-
brates. Therefore, the human anxiety may indeed be based
on aspects inherited from the evolutionary history as well
as on high-order cognitive processes. Table 1 clearly shows
that some very rudimentary aspects of the behavioural re-
sponses are present in unicellular organisms such as proto-
zoan and ancestral nonsegmented worms such as nematodes
(novelty, pleasantness, and goal conductiveness checks, as-
sociated with a behavioural response and with the presence
of stress hormones), probably indicating the high survival
potential of these aspects of emotional responses in general
and of anxiety in particular. In insects, the response is en-
riched by an additive appraisal check (coping potential), the
presence of a speciﬁc emotional expression characterized by
postures, vocalisations, and pheromones, and by the release
of speciﬁc monoamines in response to environmental chal-
lenges. The physiological response to danger is documented
in crustaceans as well as molluscs; this enables us to distin-
guish the pure behavioural response from action tendencies
in which a modiﬁcation in the physiological indicators may
appear before the behavioural response occurs. The logistic
systems supporting the main facets of human anxiety appear
in vertebrates (the vegetative and central nervous systems).
Low-order vertebrates (ﬁsh, amphibians, and even reptiles)
possessanautonomicnervoussystemcoordinatingthephys-
iological response to stressful situations. This system is asso-
ciated with the hypothalamus and brain areas that are func-
tionally homologous to subcortical areas involved in fear in
higher-order species (e.g. the amygdala and the hippocam-
pus). In birds, speciﬁc responses related to their ability to
regulate body temperature appear. In mammals, a functionalC. Belzung and P. Philippot 11
Table 1: Summary of the ﬁndings about the presence of the diﬀerent emotional responses and of the diﬀerent logistic systems necessary for
emotions across the phylum. Grey cells indicate presence of the process or system in a given phylum. SEC is stimulus evaluation check. FE is
functional equivalent.
























































































































































a Concerns not the structure per se, but the thalamocortical lamina 1 pathway aﬀerent of this structure.
b Concerns orangutans, chimpanzees, and bonobos.
SEC is stimulus evaluation check.
FE is functional equivalent
amygdala is present, with many subdivisions. Primates are
characterized by their ability to display speciﬁc facial expres-
sions in reaction to danger; they are associated with an im-
portant facial musculature. Finally, some very sophisticated
facets of emotional processes such as autonoetic conscious-
nessappearinconjunctionwithsomespeciﬁcconnectionsof
parts of the prefrontal areas necessary for the conscious per-
ception of the visceral changes related to emotions, of emo-
tional control, or of retrieval of memories from past experi-
ence.
At ﬁrst sight, Table 1 reveals a striking phenomenon:
many emotional processes related to anxiety can be executed
even in the absence of the logistical structures that support
them in humans. For instance, while insects already display
a large range of emotional processes such as appraisal, ac-
tion tendencies, and emotional expression, they are lacking
many of the structures, especially in the vegetative and cen-
tral nervous systems, that are governing these facets of anx-
iety in humans. This observation is even more pronounced
in crustaceans and molluscs. This suggests that the processes
and functions active in anxiety appear in lower-order species
that have not developed the neural, chemical, or anatomi-
cal structures that support them in humans. In these lower
species, functionally equivalent structures might organize
theseprocesses.Further,onthephylogeneticscale,theevolu-
tion would have developed ad hoc structures for more func-
tional diversity and eﬃciency. This view is in line with a
Lamarckian perspective on the phylogeny of anxiety.
Another remarkable point that can be seen in Table 1 is
that insects possess the four SECs necessary to fear. Indeed,
they have the ability to appraise the novelty, the pleasantness,
the goal conductiveness, and the coping potential of a given12 Neural Plasticity
situation. Interestingly, these abilities exist independently of
other features of the anxiety response, such as the physiolog-
ical response to fearful situations. These processes seem in-
dependent of the presence of speciﬁc brain areas such as lim-
bic structures that do not exist in the insect nervous system,
which suggests that they may be realized via other logistical
systems in these species.
Further, Table 1 also allows assessing the relationship be-
tween a given process and a given logistical structure. For
example, cognitive biases are central to human models of
pathological anxiety (e.g., [191]). Recent research has shown
that the amygdala plays a central role in attentional biases to-
wards threat in pathological anxiety [176]. As displayed in
Table 1, it is interesting to note that empirical evidence has
documented such cognitive biases only in species that have
an amygdala. Hence, the present phylogenetic approach con-
ﬁrmsthattheamygdalaplaysacentralroleincognitivebiases
observed in anxiety.
Diﬀerent aspects of the literature reviewed above clearly
suggest that anxiety as a conscious anticipation of danger
only appears in great apes. This capacity, that implies auto-
noeticawareness,isdirectlyrelatedtothedevelopmentofthe
neocortex and its connections with the limbic system and
with the thalamus. This suggests that the capacity to rep-
resent oneself and one’s reactions to hypothetical situations
depends upon the capacity to strategically activate emotion
networks or representations of emotional states. This reﬂex-
ive capacity would be shared only by great apes and humans.
Thus it might be that only great apes experience anxiety as
humans, with its apprehension component. This does not
mean that other species (e.g., other mammals such as ro-
dents) may not have the aptitude to experiment anxiety with
its anticipation dimension. However, in the case of lower
mammals, this anticipation may not be conscious and may
not be related to the ability to activate a representation of the
situation with its possible consequences.
Finally, Table 1 also allows ﬁnding out the most relevant
aspects of the anxiety response in a phylogenetic perspective.
It thus seems that the coping appraisal check, the diversiﬁ-
cation of the emotional response, including the emotional
expression and the physiological response, and the capacity
for autonoetic awareness are the most relevant of these di-
mensions. Indeed, the coping potential ability enables us to
separate insects from lower invertebrates, the diversiﬁcation
of the emotional response occurs at higher levels of the phy-
lum (facial expressions appear in monkeys) and, ﬁnally, au-
tonoetic consciousness appears in great apes.
To come back to our initial question, whether there is
a qualitative diﬀerence between human and animal anxi-
ety, Table 1 and our discussion of it suggest that it might
not be the case. Rather, a clear phylogenetic trend appears,
punctuated,thought,byimportantsteps,asthethreedimen-
sions identiﬁed in the preceding paragraph. What is proper
to human anxiety seems to be due to the well developed
self-awareness capacity in that species. This feature, however,
seemstobealreadyshared,toalesserextend,withgreatapes.
In conclusion, the present review proposes a general
frame for discussing anxiety in the context of phylogeny.
In many cases, the data necessary to assess the presence of
a given process are not available and additional empirical
work may be necessary to clarify this question. Still, as tes-
tiﬁed by the points highlighted in the general discussion, this
approach proves to be heuristic, both for our understand-
ing on how a phenomenon such as anxiety varies across the
phylogeny, and for our understanding of the processes and
logistic systems underlying anxiety.
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